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Abstract— Decentralized Ledger Technology (DLT), popular-
ized by the Bitcoin network, aims to keep track of a ledger of
valid transactions between agents of a virtual economy without
the need of a central institution for coordination. In order
to keep track of a faithful and accurate list of transactions,
the ledger is broadcast and replicated across the machines
in a peer-to-peer network. To enforce that the transactions
in the ledger are valid (i.e., there is no negative balance
or double spending), the network as a whole coordinates to
accept or reject new transactions according to a set of rules
aiming to detect and block the operation of malicious agents
(i.e., Byzantine attacks). Consensus protocols are particularly
important to coordinate the operation of the network, since
they are used to reconcile potentially conflicting versions of the
ledger. Regardless of the architecture and consensus mechanism
used, the resulting economic networks remains largely similar,
with economic agents driven by incentives under a set of rules.
Due to the intense activity in this area, proper mathematical
frameworks to model and analyze the behavior of blockchain-
enabled systems are essential. In this paper, we address this
need and provide the following contributions: (i) we establish a
formal framework, using tools from dynamical systems theory,
to mathematically describe the core concepts in blockchain-
enabled networks, (ii) we apply this framework to the Bitcoin
network and recover the key properties of the Bitcoin economic
network, and (iii) we connect our modeling framework with
powerful tools from control engineering, such as Lyapunov-like
functions, to properly engineer economic systems with provable
properties. Apart from the aforementioned contributions, the
mathematical framework herein proposed lays a foundation for
engineering more general economic systems built on emerging
Turing complete networks, such as the Ethereum network,
through which complex alternative economic models are being
explored.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, serious
abuses by major financial institutions initiated a series of
events resulting in a collapse of the loosely regulated fi-
nancial network. This crash unveiled major weaknesses of
traditional financial system and instigated a general feel-
ing of distrust on banking institutions. In this context,
decentralized economic systems based on cryptocurrencies,
such as Bitcoin [1], were developed and launched by a
group of cryptographic activists who believed in social
change through censorship-resistant and privacy-enhancing
technologies. Prior to Bitcoin, several attempts to establish
digital currencies were made, including b-money by Dai [2],
hashcash by Finney [3], and bit gold by Szabo [4]. Instead
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of relying on large financial institutions for their operation,
these cryptocurrencies proposed a decentralized economy in
which a collection of economic agents coordinate through a
peer-to-peer networks of computers via a blockchain proto-
col.
At a high level, blockchain aims to keep track of a ledger
of valid transactions between agents of the economy without
the need of a central institution for coordination. In order to
keep track of a faithful and accurate list of transactions, the
ledger is broadcast and replicated across all the machines
in a peer-to-peer network. To enforce that the transactions
in the ledger are valid (i.e., there is no negative balance or
double spending), the network ‘as a whole’ coordinates to
accept or reject new transactions according to a set of rules
aiming to detect and block the operation of malicious agents
(i.e., Byzantine attacks). Blockchain implements this idea
by bunching together a group of new transactions that are
added into a chain of blocks only if these transactions are
validated by the peer-to-peer network. Consensus protocols
are particularly important in this validation step, since they
are commonly used to reconcile conflicting versions of the
ledger. A particular protocol used to enforce consensus is
Proof of Work (PoW) [5], currently used in Bitcoin and
Ethereum. PoW is just one particular example of many other
consensus protocols, such as the Practical Byzantine Fault
Tolerant algorithm (PBFT) [6], Proof of Stake (PoS) [7], or
Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) [8], to mention a few. These
consensus protocols differ by their degree of decentralization,
fault tolerance, throughput, and scalability [9].
It is worth mentioning that, beyond applications in cryp-
tocurrency, blockchain can be used to store other forms of
data on the network [10]. This capability has inspired a
plethora of protocols and applications aiming to, for example,
certify the existence [11] and tracking of asset ownership
[12]. A notable application is Ethereum, a blockchain with a
Turing-complete programming language [13]. Ever since the
inception of Ethereum, there has been an explosion of tokens
sitting on top of the Ethereum network [14], [15], [16]. Re-
gardless of the architecture and consensus mechanism used,
the resulting economic networks remains largely similar,
with economic agents driven by incentives under a set of
rules. Recent efforts have focused on implementing these
currencies and other business logic such as decentralized
exchanges through on-chain programs called smart contracts,
first defined by Szabo in the 1990’s [17], [18].
Due to the intense recent activity in this area, proper
mathematical frameworks to model and analyze the behavior
of blockchain-enabled systems are essential. In this direction,
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we find notable work by DeFigueiredo and Barr on path
independence [19] and Dandekar et al. on credit networks
[20]. These works lay down the theoretical foundation for
projects like Ripple [21] and Stellar [22]. The main objective
of this paper is to propose a new mathematical frame-
work, based on tools from dynamical systems theory and
control engineering, to model and analyze the function of
blockchain-enabled systems. Before we provide more details
about our particular modeling framework, let us describe
the blockchain from a network point of view. In particular,
the blockchain is comprised of two different networks: (a) a
peer-to-peer computer network whose objective is to enforce
and broadcast a valid state of the ledger, and (b) a network
of valid transactions whose edges represent transactions
and whose nodes are unique addresses used to encode the
source and destination of a particular transaction. The main
objective of the blockchain protocol is to keep a valid, up-
to-date copy of the structure of network b) in all the nodes
in network a).
As we mention above, we use tools from dynamical
systems theory to model the function of the blockchain which
is independent of the underlying computational infrastructure
implemented. In particular, we borrow a modeling framework
widely used in control engineering called state space repre-
sentation [23]. According to this framework, there is a set
of abstract variables, called states, evolving over time (either
continuous or discrete) according to a set of rules. In the
discrete-time case, the evolution rules are described in terms
of a first-order difference equation, in which the values of the
states at a given time t P N depend exclusively on the values
of the states at time t´1. Hence, given the initial values for
the states at the origin of time (i.e., t “ 0), it is possible to
recover the states at any time t ą 0 by solving this recursion.
There is a rich mathematical theory to analyze state-space
models, specially in the so-called linear case, in which the
states at time t depend on the states at time t´ 1 according
to a linear transformation. In this paper, we propose a linear
state-space model of the blockchain network whose set of
states represent transaction addresses. Notice that, as new
transactions take place in the decentralized economy, the
number of states in the model increases monotonically over
time. This results in some technical difficulties that we over-
come by proposing a linear time-expanding (LTE) state-space
model which we will use to analyze the temporal behavior
of the blockchain. As a reference case, we will model and
analyze the evolution of the state in the public Bitcoin
network using the aforementioned LTE modeling framework.
Using tools from state-space theory (in particular, Lyapunov-
like functions [24]), we will illustrate how to enforce a global
property, namely, the total amount of currency in the system,
using local state-transition rules.
The paper is structured as follows: After providing appro-
priate background, we describe the LTE state-space model
in Section II. In Section III, we analyze the behavior of
the Bitcoin network using our framework and provide tools
for optimization and control enabled by our framework in
SectionIV. We finalize with some conclusions and future
considerations in Section V.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The following characterization attempts to create a useful
abstraction over the properties of a blockchain network. It is
not an attempt to describe how a blockchain network works,
but to provide tools to engineer economic systems within
such a network. All state variables are real-valued to make
derivations more intuitive and straightforward.
A. Characterizing the Ledger
Definition 1: The Ledger State is a shared data structure
Bpkq P B of a blockchain network which evolves in discrete
time denoted by k P N. B denotes the domain space of all
valid ledger states Bpkq for any k.
The Ledger State evolves in discrete time k, according to
the rules and actions of all accounts. Each account is only ac-
cessible through the ownership of its private key. The Ledger
State can thus be partitioned as Bpkq “ ŚaPAk Bapkq
where Ak denotes the set of all accounts at block k andŚ
denotes the generalized cartesian product.
Definition 2: An Account is a unique element in a ledger,
identified by a public address pkpaq with an associated pri-
vate key sk. sk is required as a proof of right to both modify
code defining the account and perform actions defined by the
code.
An account may contain code defining its state variables,
external methods for interacting with other accounts, and
other internally-used supporting methods. Since public keys
are the unique identifiers of accounts, PK “ Ak is the set of
all public keys, similar to notation used in the cryptography
community.
Definition 3: A Method is a state transition function
f : pU ,X q Ñ X (1)
where U “ Upxq for x P X is the set of legal actions.
Each method is defined by a particular account and is
made available to a set of accounts. The set of methods
provided by account i that are available to account j is
denoted Fpi,jq with elements of the form
fl : pUl,X q Ñ X (2)
where l denotes the integer index of the functions within the
set. The actions Ulpxq available to account j may depend
explicitly on xi.
A holder of the private key for account a can take any
action by using any method in the set
Fa “
ď
i
Fpi,aq (3)
which has the associates space of actions
Uapxq “
ď
lPFa
Ulpxq (4)
for any x P X .
For the purpose of discussion, it is not required to further
define internal operations that do not involve other accounts.
Accounts are assumed to be passive explicitly and hence
any internal state changes can be adequately accounted for
in mappings Fa.
The Ledger State directly related to account a at block k
is
Bapkq “ txapkq, Tapkqu (5)
where Tapkq is an ordered list of all transactions, involving
account a in block k. Ordering is required as earlier changes
to the state may influence the validity of later transactions
in the sequence.
Definition 4: A Transaction denoted by tx is the list of
state changes caused by a discrete action u P Ua for some ac-
count a P Apkq. The initiating account is denoted a0 and the
other accounts whose states are impacted by the transaction
are denoted by ai for i P 1, 2, 3, ...n; therefore the transaction
itself is defined as the list tx “ r∆xa0 ,∆xa1 , . . . ,∆xans
where ∆xai is the change in state of account ai as a result
of the action u represented by the transaction tx.
Under this notation, state transitions within a transaction
are atomic and intermediate state transitions that may occur
as part of a smart contract are not accounted for. A finer
grained model would be required to handle that level of
precision.
The simplest transaction occurs when u P Ua0 . The
transaction only modifies the state of the initiating account by
legally calling a method f P Fa0 that does not change the
state of any other accounts. The transaction is completely
characterized by ∆xa0 and can be validated by evaluating
fpu, xq within the sequence of transactions Ta0pkq and
showing that xa0 `∆xa0 “ fpu, xq|a0 P Xa0 . The notation
fp¨q|a denotes the element of the output of fp¨q associated
with account a.
A more interesting case is when account a0 takes an
action u P Uao which changes the state of other accounts
ai P Ak. In order for tx to be a valid transaction the resulting
state transitions for each other account must be valid. If the
function f is implemented by calling other methods, the
validity only holds if all methods are properly applied.
The rules on domain X are directly characterized by the
range of state transition functions provided by accounts so
it suffices to check the computation of fpu, xq to assert the
validity of each output account state:
xa0 `∆xa0 “ fapu, xq|a0 P Xa0 ,
xa1 `∆xa1 “ fapu, xq|a1 P Xa1 ,
. . .
xan `∆xan “ fapu, xq|an P Xan .
Definition 5: A Transaction Block is an ordered list of
transactions TXpkq “ rtx0, tx1, . . . , txms. Since transac-
tions are lists of account state changes, it can interpreted as
a flat list. A block is valid if each individual transaction is
computed correctly and the state change for each account
after each sequential transaction is valid.
Consider a block k with prior account states xpk´1q, the
global account state update is given by
xpkq “ xpk ´ 1q `∆xpkq (6)
where ∆x is the global account state update achieved by all
transactions in TXpkq.
∆xapkq “ xapkq ´ xapk ´ 1q “
ÿ
i
∆xpiqa , @a P Ak (7)
where the index i denotes the indices of all tx P Tapkq Ď
TXpkq, applying the definition Tapkq is the set of transac-
tions at block k including state changes to account a. The
global state update
∆xpkq “ xpkq ´ xpk ´ 1q (8)
can be completely characterized by TXpkq and evaluated
account-wise according to equation (7).
Definition 6: A Block is the ledger state Bpkq at k which
given the definitions above can be formally characterized as
the pair
Bpkq “ pxpkq,TXpkqq. (9)
The underlying mechanisms that maintain the state of the
blockchain do so by keeping the transaction history. This
makes a direct connection to dynamical systems theory
xpKq “ xp0q `
Kÿ
k“1
∆xpkq (10)
where xp0q denotes the initial state, also referred to as the
genesis block.
Result 1: The evolution of the Ledger State Bpkq for k “
0, 1, 2, . . . is the trajectory of a discrete time second order
networked system.
It is a networked system comprised of accounts a with
locally defined internal dynamics and rules for interacting
according to the account Definition 2. It is a discrete second
order system because the ledger state Bpkq contains pre-
cisely the states xapkq and the backward discrete derivatives
∆xapkq “ xapkq ´ xapk ´ 1q for all accounts a P Ak.
Any mechanism that can be implemented as an account
under this framework provides an explicit contribution to the
actions available to all other accounts within the system. The
explicit characterization of an account and its subsequent
state changes permits the estimation of changes in any
utilities defined over the network state. Using the second
order discrete networked system model, it is possible to both
formally analyze the reachable state space and simulate the
response to incentives with respect to a variety of behavioral
assumptions.
B. Characterizing the Peer-to-Peer Network
Under this formal model there are two distinct concepts
matching the term Network. The state space model defines
the evolution of a network of interacting accounts. From this
point of view, the economic network is a robotic network
with agents represented by accounts, each of which has its
own unique state space and action space defined in part
by all of the other agents (accounts) in the network. The
agent (account) states of all network participants and their
backward discrete derivatives are visible to other agents and
any external observer capable of querying the Ledger State.
Consideration of the external viewer brings attention to
the other concept of a network which is required to model
this system; the communication and computation network
responsible for maintaining account states, computing state
updates, verifying the validity of blocks of transactions, and
to agree on the correct sequence of blocks when multiple
valid sequences are available.
Definition 7: A Node is a member of the Peer-to-Peer
Network with the ability to broadcast a transaction tx for
which it can prove control of the initiating account a0 using
the associated private key, and the ability to verify the
validity of transactions broadcast by other nodes.
Definition 8: The Peer-to-Peer Network is the set of
nodes j P V , participating in the communication and compu-
tation network, each maintaining a copy of the Ledger State
Bjpkq and edges in this network represent communication
between nodes.
Note that each node j may have its belief of the Ledger
State Bjpkq such that for any two nodes Bjpkq ‰ Bj1pkq
for j ‰ j1. However, It is guaranteed by the underlying
cryptographic protocol that both Bjpkq,Bj1pkq P B.
Definition 9: A Chain is a valid sequence of Ledger
States, CpKq “ rBpkq P B for k “ 0, 1, . . . ,Ks P BK`1
where Bp0q is the genesis block and K is the block height.
The cryptographic protocol maintaining the ledger uses
sequences of hashing functions to maintain a strict ordering
on blocks such that any attempt to manipulate the history
of the ledger state is immediately detectable by all nodes
in the communication and computation network. Since the
cryptographic protocol only accepts blocks for which all state
transitions are defined by legal transactions, the chain is also
guaranteed to contain a self consistent historical trajectory
of the state space model, both states and derivatives, starting
with the initial condition xp0q as defined in the genesis block.
Returning to the issue of nodes maintaining valid but
different chains CjpKjq ‰ Cj1pKj1q which conclude with
Ledge States BjpKjq,Bj1pKj1q P B where Kj and Kj1 may
be different block heights.
Definition 10: The Consensus Protocol, C is the process
by which agents resolve inconsistency:
C : pC, Cq Ñ C (11)
returning which of the two otherwise valid chains supersed-
ing the other.
The existence of such a function alone does not ensure
the network does not fragment into partitions maintaining
conflicting states. To further ensure consensus, the consensus
protocol requires the following property.
Conjecture 1: The Consensus protocol must impose a
strict ordering on valid chains C P C. It is sufficient that
there exists a function
Ψ : C Ñ R (12)
such that for any C,C1 P C
C ‰ C1 ùñ ΨpCq ‰ ΨpC1q. (13)
Two nodes may resolve their inconsistency by each setting
their Chain to
C˚ “ arg max
CPtC,C1u
ΨpCq. (14)
The formalism is consistent with the Nakomoto consensus
paradigm where the function Ψ is the amount of work done
to reach the current state in the competing chains. While
technically it is possible for two chains to have exactly the
same amount of work and still differ, but such a discrete
event is a measure zero outcome in a continuous probability
distribution, thus for the Bitcoin network using total work,
equation (13) can be expected to hold with Probability 1.
For the purpose of the economic specification and subse-
quent design and analysis, it suffices to use any consensus
protocol for which Conjecture 1 holds with Probability
1. Using proof schemes such as the one described above
results in a lack of finality, meaning that there is always
the possibility that another chain will supersede the one a
node is maintaining. A consensus algorithm with finality,
meaning that agreement on Bpkq for block height K would
not be reversible by some later observation, would be by
definition Markovian. It would not be required to compare
full trajectories CpKq to come to consensus over BpKq.
PoS-based consensus methods under development aim to
achieve this property.
III. BITCOIN REFERENCE CASE
The public nature of the data in the Bitcoin economic
network has made it a great candidate for research on finan-
cial flows. These models consider graphs of flows between
accounts. This analysis will instead focus structurally on
how the very simple rules about what constitutes a valid
transaction result in well defined global properties.
A. Linear Time-Expanding Model
The Bitcoin economic network is defined over block
height k “ 0, 1, 2, . . ., and there are nk “ |Ak| accounts at
each block k with the additional caveat that nk`1 ě nk. For
consistency of notation with dynamical models on networks,
accounts will be referenced with indices i P t1, . . . , nku.
Definition 11: A Linear Time-Expanding (LTE) system
has a state space model in the form of a discrete time varying
linear model with the dimension of the state space x P Rnk
which is monotonically non-decreasing while the state update
matrices vary only in nk.
Consider a canonical form discrete time linear time vary-
ing model:
xpk ` 1q “ Akxpkq `Bkupkq (15)
where xpkq P Rnk . Under this framework Ak P Rnk`1ˆnk ,
but since there are no internal dynamics
Ak “
„
Ink
0

(16)
where Ink is the identity matrix. The matrix Bk is an all-
to-all incidence matrix encoding all possible sends Bk P
t0, 1,´1unk`1ˆmk where mk “ nk`1 ¨ pnk ´ 1q “ |Ek|
and upkq P Rmk . The edge set is given by Ek “ AkˆAk`1
because flows must original in accounts that exist at time k.
rBksie “
$&% 1 if e “ pj, iq for any j´1 if e “ pi, jq for any j
0 otherwise
(17)
Fig. 1. Illustration of incidence matrix. An edge e from i to j represents
i sending a transaction to j. Bi,e “ 1 and Bj,e “ ´1.
Result 2: The system in equation (15) is an Linear Time-
Expanding (LTE) system because for all k, Ak is an
augmented identity matrix as defined in equation (16) and
Bk is an all-to-all incidence matrix as defined in equation
(17).
The incidence matrix construction enforces the requirement
of no double spends. Under this construction the local action
uepkq P Uepkq
Uepkq “
#
ue“pi,jq P R
ˇˇÿ
j
upi,jq ď xipkq@i
+
(18)
where equation (18) enforces the requirement that accounts
cannot spend funds they do not have. Note that the require-
ment is locally enforceable, requiring only the balance of
account i and the other transactions to or from account i
during block k. Viewed from the perspective of account i
the local constraint a flow balance
xipkq `
ÿ
j
upj,iqpkq ´ upj,iqpkq ě 0. (19)
In the practice, the transactions encoded by the inputs u are
processed with a strict ordering that can be enforced with
only the sender’s state
upi,jq ď xi (20)
as in definition 5. The model in equation (19) is a re-
laxation of the enforced requirement in equation (20); any
block comprised of actions upkq that respect the individual
transaction validity requirement equation (20) will satisfy the
conservation law in equation (19). The relaxed equation in
presented to demonstrate that the case of the Bitcoin network
flow is in fact stronger than the conical network flow models
in the controls literature.
B. Introducing Rewards
Since the genesis block contained an empty state these
requirements would make for a trivial trajectory. In order
to introduce funds into the economy, a driving function
Mpkq “ µkvpkq is added:
xpk ` 1q “ Akxpkq `Bkupkq ` µkvpkq. (21)
The function Mpkq P Rnk`1 is decomposed into a scheduled
positive scalar reward µk P R` and a stochastic vector
vpkq P Rnk`1` such that
ř
i vipkq “ 1. The vector vpkq
denotes the distribution of the mining rewards across all
accounts including potential allocation to new accounts or
may be distributed by any arbitrary rule across an arbitrary
subset of accounts, such as a mining pool.
Another key property of the Bitcoin is again recovered
from out state space model. Define a scalar subspace of the
state
ypkq “ 11xpkq “
ÿ
i
xipkq. (22)
In order to under stand the behavior of this output function,
consider
xpkq ´Ak´1xpk ´ 1q “ Bkupkq ` µkvpkq (23)
and construct the state by summing the history of changes
xpKq “AK´1 ¨ ¨ ¨A0xp0q
`
K´1ÿ
k“1
AK´1 ¨ ¨ ¨Ak pxpkq ´Ak´1xpk ´ 1qq (24)
becomes
xpKq “AK´1 ¨ ¨ ¨A0xp0q
`
K´1ÿ
k“1
AK´1 ¨ ¨ ¨Ak pBkupkq ` µkvpkqq . (25)
When this expression is used to compute
ypkq “11xpKq
“11AK´1 ¨ ¨ ¨A0xp0q
`
K´1ÿ
k“1
11AK´1 ¨ ¨ ¨Ak pBkupkq ` µkvpkqq .
(26)
Since xp0q “ 0, it follows from equation (10) that
ypKq “
ÿ
k“1
µk (27)
when one recalls that Ak is an augmented identity matrix,
that 11vpkq “ 1 observes that Bk is an incidence matrix:
11Bu “ 0 for all u.
In the case of Bitcoin the mining rewards are on a
convergent schedule ensuring the maximum total supply
y8 “ lim
kÑ8 ypkq “
8ÿ
k“1
µk (28)
converges to the desired quantity.
In the Bitcoin network the mining rewards are defined over
i “ p1, . . . , 32q halving intervals ri “ pk0, k1, . . . , k209999q
each including 210000 blocks resulting in
µk “ t
50¨108
2i u
108
where k P ri. (29)
After the 32nd interval the minted block rewards cease and
the total quantity of Bitcoin is conserved. By computing
the sum over the intervals, the final sum of Bitcoin y8 “
20999999.9769, generally quoted as 21 million BTC. This
does not account for the potential loss of control of accounts
with Bitcoin balances which reduces the effective supply.
C. Globally Invariant Properties from Local Rules
While the Bitcoin economic network is a somewhat trivial
system to study from a dynamical systems perspective, it
is actually much like biological coordination models, an
example of complex global behaviors emerging from simple
local rules. The critical elements of the above example are:
‚ The trajectory of the system is defined entirely in terms
of its state transitions and the initial conditions.
‚ The dynamical system model remains structurally in-
variant even as the number of account grows un-
bounded.
‚ The inputs or actions are completely under the control
of local agents called accounts.
‚ The set of legal actions for each agent are defined and
verifiable with information local to those agents states.
‚ The definitions of the local legal actions provide prop-
erties that are consistent with suitability as a financial
ledger of record.
‚ The driving function combined with the legal actions
guarantee that a low dimensional global property is
enforced throughout the entire trajectory.
The most powerful part about this characterization is that
the system literally tracks a desired property ypkq “ řk µk
for the entire trajectory, in fact in any valid trajectory, with
no assumptions about the actions of the individual agents.
This indicates that it is proper to think of blockchain-
enabled economic systems as engineered economies where
it is possible to encode the legal state transitions in such a
manner as to mathematically ensure the emergence of a low
dimensional global properties.
IV. VALUE FUNCTIONS, INVARIANTS, OPTIMIZATION
AND CONTROL
Where Bitcoin was precisely characterized by the set of
hard coded rules, more general Turing complete networks
such as the Ethereum network are capable of much richer
state spaces and legal state transitions. In this section, the
concepts explored in the Bitcoin section will be generalized
for use in characterizing a more general system state.
Consider that each account may contribute a set of state
variables to each other account; the cardinality of the state
space grows super-linearly. At first pass this may seem to
make the system difficult to work with, the opposite may in
fact be true. The creator of an account is likely to have goals
specific to the states it instantiates and can define precisely
the functions which mutate those states including relations
to other states. In particular, the goals for the system are
likely to exist in a much lower dimension than the state itself
and thus it is totally reasonable to provide an extremely high
degree of freedom to the agents in the system while formally
enforcing those goals.
For the purpose of this characterization, consider a smart
contract account α in Turing complete computational net-
work.
Definition 12: The account α defines a state variable za
for all accounts a P Ak, for which the global state
zpkq “ tza P Za|@a P Aku P Z Ă X ,
where Za is an arbitrary state space contributed to every
account a by account α.
Be aware that zpkq includes part of the state of every agent
xapkq, not the local states of agent α which is denoted xαpkq.
Furthermore, the account α provides a set of methods that
allow any account to modify the global state zpkq.
Definition 13: The set of functions provided by account
α is
Fα “ tfl : pUl,Zq Ñ Zq|@lu (30)
where Ul is the set of actions or inputs to each function fl
and Z Ă X is the domain.
These functions define the feasible trajectories in the state
of the system. Engineering these systems involves formally
determining these functions in order to ensure system level
properties are met. System level properties can be character-
ized by scalar functions of the state. The system becomes
increasingly more complex as contracts are introduced to
build on each others state variables.
However, building on previous contracts is accomplished
by calling methods previously available made available to
mutate their states, it suffices for now to examine properties
in the context of a single contract; that is to say, assume
all states and state transitions are provided by account one
account α. Then zpkq “ xpkq be the full state with domain
Z “ X and Fα “ F accounts for all valid state transitions.
A. Value Functions
Value functions are output functions engineered to encode
desired global properties. By limiting them to be positive
scalars additional mathematical equipment can be brought
to bear regarding convergence properties.
Definition 14: A Value function is a non-negative scalar
function of the state of the economic network
V : X Ñ R`
encoding some property.
These functions are measures of properties and need to
be constructed for a particular property. The first case, that
will be considered is when V pxq “ c encodes an equality
constraint. It is possible to achieve such a constraint within
the network by proving an invariant.
Definition 15: An invariant property V pxq “ c is ensured
by verifying that
V pflpu, xqq “ V pxq
for all functions fl P F , actions u P Ul and all legal states
x P X .
In the definition above, all states are considered but as
needed the same definition can be used over an arbitrary
subset set of the state space. In practice, the engineer will
find it prudent to work with a minimal subset of the state.
The fewer states which actually appear in the domain
of V pxq and flpxq the more easily the invariant property
Fig. 2. Illustration of invariant properties. V is invariant under all fpu, xq
for all valid actions u.
in Definition 15 will be to demonstrate. Further note that
the construction of V pxq allows a large class of set based
constraints.
In the Bitcoin example the positivity requirement could
be encoded as V pxq “ ´ři mint0, xiu=0. This function is
well defined for all x P Rn, but is equal to zero only if every
balance is positive. The fact that all send actions ue require
that xi ą ue where e “ pi, jq guarantees this invariant.
B. Maximization
A similar construction will allow other dynamics to be
enforced. In the case of a value function V pxq which
the economic network wishes to collectively maximize, the
following construction is sufficient.
Definition 16: A global maximization property over value
function V pxq is guaranteed by the requirement
V pflpu, xqq ě V pxq
for all functions fl P F , actions u P Ul and all legal states
x P X .
Observe that this does not guarantee infinite growth of
V pxq but rather that V pxq cannot be reduced by any legal
action provided. As in the case of invariant properties, it is
prudent to restrict the subset of the state which your smart
contract maintains as such arguments may break down in the
case where other accounts provide functions that operate on
these state variables in a manner which violates the property.
A strict version of this mechanism can be imposed if
V pflpu, xqq ě p1` qV pxq (31)
for  ą 0. This is the type of construct that can be used
to ensure that perpetual revenues can be produced by the
ongoing use of a network. However, if these profits are
not fairly aligned with the services provided in facilitating
transactions, transactions may halt and from the perspective
of this system, time will have stopped and there will be no
more revenue.
C. Value Functions as Lyapunov Functions
A Lyapunov function is analogous to a potential function
and is a tool for proving stability around an equilibrium
in a dynamical system. In the case of blockchain-enabled
economic systems, the dynamics are entirely defined by the
states and methods provided by accounts. As a result one
need not discover Lyapunov functions to prove convergence
to desired properties but can instead engineer the functions
provided working backwards from a value function of choice.
This approach is more powerful even than invariant simple
invariant properties because the system will persistently
move towards the desired state even if some unforeseen
action causes a change in V pxq.
Definition 17: An exponentially globally convergent prop-
erty V pxq “ 0 is guaranteed by the requirement
V pflpu, xqq ď γV pxq
for all functions fl P F , actions u P Ul and all legal states
x P X where γ P r0, 1q is the exponential convergence rate.
These results are simple consequences of the Brouwer fixed-
point theorem [25] provided that the space X is a convex
compact set. Note that creating such a construction is non-
trivial, but it formally ensures that all legal actions will
drive the system towards the target subset of the state tx P
X |V pxq “ 0u. This construction further implies that crypto-
economic networks are well suited to Lyapunov style control.
Definition 18: Consider an output function y “ gpxq and
target trajectory ypkq, define a Value function V pxq such that
V pxq “ 0 if and only if gpxq “ ypkq. This construction will
be denoted a Lyapunov controller provided that
V pflpu, xqq ď γV pxq
for all functions fl P F , actions u P Ul and all legal states
x P X where γ P r0, 1q is the exponential convergence rate.
The resulting system will under all legal actions continuously
attempt to converge to the subset of the state space here
gpxq “ ypkq; note that the exponential convergent rate must
be faster than the evolution of the target signal ypkq in order
for this process to track the desired target within a reasonable
neighborhood.
Returning to the Bitcoin example, enforcing the invariant
ypKq “ ři xipKq “ řKk“1 µk is actually an explicit case of
controlling the system to track a low dimensional target state
that evolves over time using a positive scalar value function.
No convergence argument as in Definition 18 because the
value function was invariant under all legal state transitions
as in Definition 15.
It will be interesting to see what types of emergent
coordination could be engineered in economic systems by
leveraging Lyapunov functions in the design of the legal
action sets. It is expected that more general conservation
equations may encoded to properly account for financial
value changing forms, similar to how conservation of energy
is handled in physical systems.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
This document builds a bridge between dynamical systems
theory and blockchain-enabled economic systems. In partic-
ular, we propose a state-space representation of the economic
system in terms of linear time-expanding system. This novel
representation allows us to use a plethora of powerful tools
developed in the context of control theory for the analysis
and design of blockchain-enabled systems. In particular,
we propose the use of Lyapunov-like functions, originally
developed in the context of dynamical systems, to properly
engineer economic systems with provable properties. A few
comments are in order: First, no direct attention is paid
to the actions of individuals within the network and all
guarantees proposed are derived from the spaces of actions
those individuals might take. Second, it may not always
be possible to sufficiently limit the action spaces to ensure
desired properties without considering individual incentives.
In addition to the definitions provided above the author posits
that value functions can be used to analyze the alignment
of incentives of individuals actions with global objectives
by comparing the gradients of local incentive functions with
those of the global value functions.
A key aspect of our future research will include the
design and development of simple on-chain controllers and
the empirical study of the evolution of the states in the
Ethereum ecosystem for comparison with theoretical prin-
ciples outlined above. Tools for streamlined access to data
from blockchain economic networks are under development.
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